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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the relationship between CG mechanisms and firm performance 
among firms in the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) for the periods 2007-2011. Two 
models have been developed using the framework of agency theory, stewardship theory, 
and resource dependence theory to test this study’s hypotheses. Model 1 comprises three 
categories of determinants. The first category is board of directors’ characteristics: board 
Royal family members, board size, independence, board meetings, board financial 
knowledge, CEO duality, and board multiple directorships. The second category of 
determinants is audit committee characteristics: audit committee outside financial 
expertise, multiple directorships, size, independence, meetings, and financial expertise. 
The third category is ownership structure: Royal family, non-Royal family, government, 
and domestic corporate ownership. Model 2, including ownership structure, comprises 
board of directors’ effectiveness score and audit committee effectiveness score. This 
study utilizes the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) models. The final sample comprises 
573 observations. The results showed that Royal family members, board size, and CEO 
duality are positively associated with firm performance. In contrast, board meetings, 
board financial knowledge, and board multiple directorship are negatively associated 
with firm performance, whereas board independence has no association. Audit 
committee characteristics, outside financial expertise, size, independence, and meetings 
are negatively associated with firm performance. In contrast, financial expertise is 
positively associated with firm performance, whereas multiple directorships have no 
relationship. For both models, ownership structure—Royal family, non-Royal family, 
government, and domestic corporations—is positively associated with firm performance. 
Board of directors’ effectiveness score and audit committee effectiveness score are 
positively associated with firm performance. It should be noted that the findings 
established in this study could be useful to regulators, especially the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI), the Capital Market Authority (CMA), Tadawual, and 
the Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accounting (SOCPA) to improve CG 
practices. For companies, this study proposes that they should put more emphasis on 
enhancing the role and the quality of the board of directors and audit committee members, as 
they are involved in the decisions that improve firm performance. 
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ABSTRAK 
 
Tesis ini mengkaji hubungan antara mekanisma CG dan prestasi firma dalam kalangan 
firma di Bursa Saham Saudi (Tadawul) bagi tempoh 2007-2011. Dua model telah 
dibentuk dengan menggunakan kerangka teori agensi, teori pengawasan (stewardship 
theory), dan teori kebergantungan sumber bagi menguji hipotesis kajian. Model 1 terdiri 
daripada tiga kategori penentu. Kategori pertama ialah ciri-ciri lembaga pengarah: ahli 
keluarga diraja lembaga, saiz lembaga, kebebasan, mesyuarat lembaga, pengetahuan 
kewangan lembaga, dualiti CEO, dan pelbagai jawatan pengarah lembaga. Kategori 
penentu kedua ialah ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit: kepakaran luar kewangan jawatankuasa 
audit, pelbagai jawatan pengarah, saiz, kebebasan, mesyuarat, dan kepakaran kewangan. 
Kategori ketiga ialah struktur pemilikan: keluarga diraja, bukan keluarga diraja, 
kerajaan, dan pemilikan korporat domestik. Model 2, termasuk struktur pemilikan, 
terdiri daripada skor keberkesanan lembaga pengarah dan skor keberkesanan 
jawatankuasa audit. Kajian ini menggunakan model Weighted Least Squares (WLS). 
Sampel akhir terdiri daripada 573 penelitian. Kajian menunjukkan bahawa ahli keluarga 
diraja, saiz lembaga, dan dualiti CEO berkait secara positif dengan prestasi firma. 
Sebaliknya, mesyuarat lembaga, pengetahuan kewangan lembaga, dan pelbagai jawatan 
pengarah lembaga berkait secara negatif dengan prestasi firma manakala kebebasan 
lembaga tidak mempunyai sebarang hubung kait. Ciri-ciri jawatankuasa audit, kepakaran 
kewangan luar, saiz, kebebasan, dan mesyuarat berkait secara negatif dengan prestasi 
firma. Sebaliknya, kepakaran kewangan berkait secara positif dengan prestasi firma 
manakala pelbagai jawatan pengarah lembaga tidak mempunyai hubung kait. Bagi 
kedua-dua model, struktur pemilikan—keluarga diraja, bukan keluarga diraja, kerajaan, dan 
korporat domestik—berhubung kait secara positif dengan prestasi firma. Skor keberkesanan 
lembaga pengarah dan skor keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit berhubung kait secara positif 
dengan prestasi firma. Dapatan kajian yang diperoleh berguna bagi pengawal selia 
terutamanya di Kementerian Perdagangan dan Industri, Lembaga Pasaran Modal (CMA), 
Tadawual, dan Saudi Organization for Certified Public Accounting (SOCPA) bagi 
menambah baik amalan CG. Bagi syarikat pula, kajian ini mencadangkan agar syarikat 
memberikan lebih penekanan terhadap penambahbaikan peranan dan kualiti lembaga 
pengarah dan ahli jawatankuasa audit memandangkan mereka terlibat dalam membuat 
keputusan yang boleh meningkatkan prestasi firma. 
 
Kata kunci: prestasi firma, tadbir urus korporat, Arab Saudi  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background and Motivation of the Study  
Firm performance has been under scrutiny, especially after the Asian, Russian Federation, 
and Brazil financial crisis that started in 1997, and the failing of some companies in the 
United States such as Enron, Xerox, Worldcom, and Parmalat, and the Saudi Stock 
Exchange (Tadawul) crash in early 2006. In addition, the separation and conflicts of 
interest between shareholders and managers in companies may lead to agency problems 
(Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Ishak & Napier, 2006; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Mustapha & Che Ahmad, 2011). Corporate Governance (CG) is one solution to the 
problems stemming from these crises and to align shareholder and management interests, 
or to reduce conflicts of interest which will, consequently, result in enhancing firm 
performance (Al-Abbas, 2008; Al-Hamidy, 2010; Al-Hussain, 2009; Al-Moataz & Basfar, 
2010; Al-Twaijry, 2007).  
Most empirical studies have documented a positive link between CG mechanisms and 
CG, even though it is not easy to establish the link between the two (Bhagat, Bolton & 
Romano, 2008). There is a wide belief that CG best practices could lead to superior firm 
performance (Young, 2003). Different ideas and theories have surfaced; the most 
important issue is that a huge amount of empirical research in the firm performance 
discipline has reported an association between the practice of good CG and firm 
performance in different contexts in the world. For example, Aguilera and Cuervo-
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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